South-East History Boards
May 24, 2017, 12:50:07 PM *
Welcome, Guest. Please login or register.

Login with username, password and session length
News:
Welcome to the South-East History Boards, covering Kent, Sussex, Hants, IoW and Surrey
 
   Home   Help Forum Guidelines Search Login Register  
Pages: [1]
  Print  
Author Topic: Hauptmann Joseph Oerstermann memorial, South Downs Way  (Read 1773 times)
0 Members and 1 Guest are viewing this topic.
Jebb of Wessex
Contributor
***
Offline Offline

Posts: 19


« on: November 04, 2013, 22:15:55 PM »

Anybody who has walked the South Downs Way east of Harting Down will have come across the memorial stone to 25-year old Luftwaffe Hauptmann Joseph Oerstermann who remained at the controls of his stricken Ju88 bomber allowing his two crew mates to escape by parachute on 'Eagles Day' 13 August 1940,

They were shot down by a Hurricane from Tangmere airfield flown by P/O Meyers who was himself shot down later that day but survived.

'Eagles Day' was the first day of the German bombing offensive against British civilian targets. Until August 1940 both the RAF and the Luftwaffe had held back from attacking non-military targets - but Churchill was worried by Gallup Polls reporting that most British people were against war and wanted peace negotiations. So he ordered Bomber Command to attack civilian targets in Germany knowing it would bring retaliation from the Luftwaffe and that the consequential bombing of British civilians would cause ranks to close and end once and for all any talk of peace.
Logged
daveSea
.
*
Offline Offline

Posts: 586


« Reply #1 on: November 05, 2013, 08:52:48 AM »

I thought that the RAF bombed Berlin on the 25 August 1940 in reponse to a Luftwaffe raid on London on 24 August 1940.
It seems the Luftwaffe bombing was probably a mistake. 
Logged

Dave
Den Chersplat
Contributor
***
Offline Offline

Posts: 108


« Reply #2 on: November 05, 2013, 13:41:22 PM »

Anybody who has walked the South Downs Way east of Harting Down will have come across the memorial stone to 25-year old Luftwaffe Hauptmann Joseph Oerstermann who remained at the controls of his stricken Ju88 bomber allowing his two crew mates to escape by parachute on 'Eagles Day' 13 August 1940,

They were shot down by a Hurricane from Tangmere airfield flown by P/O Meyers who was himself shot down later that day but survived.

'Eagles Day' was the first day of the German bombing offensive against British civilian targets. Until August 1940 both the RAF and the Luftwaffe had held back from attacking non-military targets - but Churchill was worried by Gallup Polls reporting that most British people were against war and wanted peace negotiations. So he ordered Bomber Command to attack civilian targets in Germany knowing it would bring retaliation from the Luftwaffe and that the consequential bombing of British civilians would cause ranks to close and end once and for all any talk of peace.

RAF bombers were raiding Germany long before Churchill came to power, and much of what had been Chamberlain's cabinet wanted peace.

Lord Halifax was actually in peace negotiations with Germany but lost out to Churchill in the power struggle of May 1940.
Logged
spiggy
Contributor
***
Offline Offline

Posts: 96


« Reply #3 on: November 05, 2013, 15:01:17 PM »

Anybody who has walked the South Downs Way east of Harting Down will have come across the memorial stone to 25-year old Luftwaffe Hauptmann Joseph Oerstermann who remained at the controls of his stricken Ju88 bomber allowing his two crew mates to escape by parachute on 'Eagles Day' 13 August 1940,


There are 1 attachment(s) in this post which you cannot view or download
sdw.gif
Logged
Man of Kent1
Valued Contributor
****
Offline Offline

Posts: 1804



« Reply #4 on: November 05, 2013, 17:48:44 PM »

I read somewhere that Churchill ordered retaliation for some bombs offloaded onto Croydon by a German bomber in trouble.
Logged
Jebb of Wessex
Contributor
***
Offline Offline

Posts: 19


« Reply #5 on: December 02, 2013, 22:30:29 PM »

My belief is that up to a certain date in August 1940 both the British and the Germans confined bombing missions to military and strategic targets only and did not focus on civilian areas. Inevitably some bombs targeting these areas fell short and hit civilian residential areas. This is what happened with the Luftwaffe bombs that fell on civilian areas in Croydon and Churchill used this as a reason to attack German civilian areas knowing that after 3 such raids the Germans would retaliate on British civilian areas - and this German retaliation would cause British public opinion to close ranks and unite in waging war on Germany with full hearted vigour. That's my understanding but I'm no expert and wouldn't die in a ditch to defend the story. P.S. It wasn't the Gallup Poll as I mentioned previously, it was a monitoring organisation called Mass Observation.
Logged
Pete
Valued Contributor
****
Offline Offline

Posts: 2419


We Wunt Be Druv


WWW
« Reply #6 on: April 27, 2016, 12:22:22 PM »

On the side of Treyford Hill near Dibling and beside the South Downs Way is a memorial to Joseph. In the morning of  13/8/1940 he was piloting a JU88 of KG54 when he was attacked by a Tangmere Hurricane from 601 Sqn piloted by P/O Mayers. 2 of the crew baled out and became POWs, it is said Oestermann stayed with the a/c to allow the others to jump. Mayers was shot down later that same day but survived. I have checked Cannock records and can't find him listed.  Photo thanks to Darren Lucas.

There are 1 attachment(s) in this post which you cannot view or download
13076743_1752597208305160_5170800220543440959_n.jpg
Logged

Sussex Bonfire - a way of life, not just for Nov 5th
Icare9
Valued Contributor
****
Offline Offline

Posts: 1100


« Reply #7 on: May 09, 2016, 18:14:35 PM »

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0025.html
TUESDAY, AUGUST 13th 1940. Weather: Early morning, low cloud base, rain easing during morning but clearing to a fine day with lengthy sunny periods by afternoon.

OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:
We had been briefed the day previous to Adler Tag that we would be going across the Channel in strong formations to attack England. At last, we would be concentrating in large bomber formations with a fighter escort. For so long, we had been flying our individual missions on simple operations like photographic reconnaissance or minelaying duties. Some, like us, had not even seen a British fighter or even fired a shot in anger and it hardly seemed as if a war was on at all. Now, our airfields had many bombers at the ready, many had been flown in from inland airfields, and I could see that now our great Luftwaffe would be at last attacking England.
FeldwebelKarl Hoffmann 1/KG30

Göring's heralded 'Eagle Day' was launched in confusion on 13th August, renewed in massive strength by a staff officer's unauthorized decision on 15 August, and thereafter continued in fierce fighting into September. Luftwaffe Intelligence reported absurdly inflated RAF losses and damage to airfields and vital installations, but they could not delude themselves about the alarming losses to Göring's Air Fleets. Contrary to German belief, Fighter Command could just about tolerate its losses of aircraft by replacements from the factories, but exhaustion and death were taking a critical toll of its experienced Pilots. The British commanders' greatest fear was that the Germans would smash the delicate defensive network by their attacks on the Sector Operations Rooms, radar stations and communications links. Some British pilots were becoming increasingly angry that they were again and again in squadron strength against huge forces of enemy aircraft. From now until the end, Dowding and Park had to resist fierce pressure to throw everything they had into the sky against the big attacks. But the essence of their brilliant handling of the struggle was that they saw so clearly that in a battle of attrition, they must be defeated. Fighter Command must achieve its victory simply by continuing to exist.
Len Deighton Battle of Britain 1980 Jonathan Cape pp128-129

"We were ordered to get a good nights sleep and wake early. This was the day that all Germany had been waiting for. Up until now most of the Luftwaffe pilots were a little frustrated because each time that we went out we thought that it was the start of the planned attack on England, and all we accomplished was the sinking of merchantmen that were plying the Channel. But we were now assured that at last that we will not be attacking channel convoys but we would be going over England itself. Our orders on this day was to make the way clear for the main attack that was planned for the following day.
Luftwaffepilot based at Air Fleet 2

If the Luftwaffe had learned something during the last few months it was that Britain had 'eyes' out there that detected their fighter and bomber formations coming across the Channel. Many of their convoy attacks had either to be aborted or they were attacked by British fighters before they had a chance to rendezvous with the target. The Germans knew of radar, in fact they had a radar system of their own, but in the late thirties when radio direction finding was in its infancy, Britain continued with experiments and made full use of the fact that electronics could warn them of any impending attack, whereas Germany decided not to follow it through.

They therefore had to destroy these seeing 'eyes' of Britain before any idea of a major attack on British cities could be made otherwise half of there bombers and fighter escorts would be wiped out before they could reach their targets.An alternative to this was to let their heavy bombers fly in across the Channel at low altitudes so that they flew below the radar beams. But this was a tricky method of operation and only specially trained crews could accomplish this low altitude flying. Another problem was that fighter escort was very ineffective at low altitudes so these low altitude missions meant that the bombers only means of defence was trying to remain unobserved, a very tricky situation.

But the attacks on the radar stations at Dover, Pevensey and Rye the previous day, although temporarily put out of action, emergency back up systems allowed all these stations to be 'back on the air' within six hours. Ventnor radar was the main problem as it had been hit hard and was the main radar in the Portsmouth/Southampton area.
The way was now clear for them to implement Adlerangriff.

When Göring first made his announcement to Luftflotte (Air Fleets) 2, 3 and 5 that Operation Adler (Eagle) would commence and that they would wipe the British Air Force from the sky in early August, the message was quickly deciphered and was in the hands of the British Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister and Hugh Dowding within an hour indicating that Adlerangriff (Eagle day) would commence on August 10th, but because of the unfavourable weather conditions was delayed until now, August 13th, but it seemed that the weather had not heard of the Göring plan of attack. Instead of the fair to good weather conditions that were predicted, the morning of the 13th loomed very overcast with low cloud over the French coast and Channel.

0510hrs: The German bombers began to take off from various airfields and the first major assault on Britain was about to begin. Most of them were airborne and were beginning to form their respective formations, when a last minute message was sent to all units that this first assault had been postponed, and that all aircraft were to return to their bases. The message was not received by the 74 Dornier bombers of KG 2 led by Oberst Johannes Fink,and he was to be escorted by 60 Bf110's of ZG 26 commanded by Oberstleutnant Joachim Huth. The weather started to deteriorate further, the forecast had been for clear and fine conditions but a blanket of low cloud covered both the French and the English coasts and the order went out for Angriffbeschrankin (Attack Canceled) owing to the weather, with the possibility of a resumption in the afternoon should the weather clear.

This message was received by Huth, who relayed the message to the rest of his 60 fighter-bombers. However, Fink's Dornier had a malfunction in its long-range radio that he did not know about and was therefore unaware that the operation had been cancelled. To compound the situation, there was no radio communication between the Bf110's and the Dorniers, and as the bombers were flying in heavy cloud Fink's Dorniers did not realize that the Me 110's had returned to base. Approaching the English coast, the Dorniers split up into two separate formations. One headed for Sheerness on the Isle of Sheppey, while the other headed towards the Coastal Command station at Eastchurch.

"I had seen the fighter escort earlier and had observed some unusual antics by Joachim Huth but thought that he was only trying to indicate to me that he had made the rendezvous with our bombers. We carried on through the cloud which although hindered our visibility, it was at times very heavy in places, I received a misunderstood message from the second wing leader radio operator 'Angriff ausfuhren' which was the order to proceed with the attack. I kept a look out and instructed other crews to do the same but we saw no sign of the escort, we assumed that in the cloud they were keeping their distance. I was constantly on the lookout for some of my less experienced pilots in these conditions as it was easy to stray too close to another aircraft. Then suddenly there was a break in the cloud. We were at about 10,000 feet and on course coming in to the Thames Estuary. I could see the coast of North Kent to my left. We had passed the naval base of Sheerness which was one of our targets, but the other target of Eastchurch Airfield lay dead ahead. What is even more surprising, was that with only ten minutes flying time to the RAF airfield we had no opposition, it now seemed that Eastchurch was there for the taking.

Oberst JoachimFink Commander Kampfgeschwader 2

0557hrs: It does appear that the radar stations at Dover and Rye that were now back in action, had detected and followed the progress of the Dornier formation, but as to the final destination of the Dorniers no one knew or could estimate their target. The formation had taken a wide berth around the Kent coast, then entered the Thames Estuary where a number of targets would be available to them. The Observer Corps at Bromley asked of Fighter Commands liaison officer, "Have we a large number of aircraft forming near Rochford?". The immediate reply from HQ was a definite 'No'.

0630hrs: Radar had also picked up an enemy formation coming in from the Channel between Hastings and Bognor and Fighter Command dispatched 43 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes), 64 Squadron Kenley (Spitfires), 87 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) and 601 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes). 601 Squadron head east towards their vectored position gaining height when a formation of Ju88s who's mission was to bomb the aerodromes at Odiham and Farnborough (Hants) are spotted on their port side.

0640hrs: P/O H.C.Mayer's who is leading "A" Flight of 601 Squadron reports a tiered formation of Bf109s and Bf110s at high altitude, and orders his flight to gain position and attack the bombers.

Mayer's starts to make his own run but he is wary as a formation of Bf110s begins to dive. Waiting for the right instant he executes a climbing right turn into them. From almost head-on he presses his firing button and sees part of the roof and fuselage of one Messerschmitt break off. Swinging around in a tight turn he finds a Ju 88 below and dives after it. He fires a five-second burst and the bomber bursts into flames. Mayer's is now alone and he searches the sky to locate his section. He spots 5 Ju 88s making for France and climbs up to intercept. He makes a beam attack, sweeping the whole formation from front to rear. One bomber falls behind and seeks safety in cloud cover. Mayer's follows, manages to relocate his prey and fires off his remaining ammunition. With one engine burning, the German plane loses height. Harried by three squadrons of British fighters, the Ju 88s miss their targets, disperse into small groups and make a disorderly retreat back to France.
Dennis NewtonA Few of the Few 1990 Australian War Memorial p94

The Ju88 that P/O Mayer's shot down could possibly have been attacked by Sgt. Hallowes of 43 Squadron. The Ju88, from 1/KG54 crashed and exploded at Treyford with the pilot's body never being found and the other two crew members being captured after baling out of the aircraft. Another Ju88 was shot down by both 601 and 43 Squadrons and crashed near Arundel (Sussex) while another Ju88 which came under fire from the Hurricanes of 601 Squadron aborted the mission early after its engines began giving trouble. Two Hurricanes of 43 Squadron were shot down with F/Lt  T. P. Dalton-Morgan baling out of his aircraft and being wounded and P/O C.A. Woods-Scawen escaping from his burning Hurricane after it crash landed. One of the aircrew baled out of a Ju88 thinking the worst was going to happen and landed in a field in the region of Tangmere.He was captured and taken to the aerodrome.


87 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) was also dispatched to intercept the formation but being scrambled late arrived after the Ju88s had decided to return to France, but they did intercept a lone Ju88 about 0800hrs south of Chichester and in the ensuing combat, one Hurricane was hit by gunfire from the enemy bomber and crashed south of Selsey Bill. Other Hurricanes of 87 Squadron continued the combat with the Ju88 receiving damage and crashing into the Channel.
Logged
tigerfeet
Newcomer
*
Offline Offline

Posts: 3


« Reply #8 on: May 08, 2017, 22:26:11 PM »

This cannot be far from where a Lightning  crashed At Linchmere on 25th January a USAAF
Lockhced Lightning crashed in a wood at
Stanley's Farm and was burnt out after its pilot,
Thomas Connc1, abandoned the aeroplane by
parachute. He was treated for minor injuries
at the King Edward VII Sanatorium, Easebourne,
although the pilots of two other Lightnings
which fell in the district were both killed.
The first of these was at Ball Wood, Bepton,
Source: Bombers Over Sussex 1943 - 1945
Pat Burgess & Andy Saunders Middleton Press
First Published Apri/1995 ISBN 1-873793-51-0
on 8th June and the othcr at Fitzlea Farm,
Graffham, on 4th July. In the Bepton incident
a Special Constable and Fireman were both
injured by exploding ammunition, but even in
post war years ammunition from this crash was
still proving hazardous when children were
injured in the 1950s after tampering with live
rounds. Childrcn are also said to have bcen
responsible for rolling one of the fighters engines
down the steeply sloping side of the
Downs at this site
Logged
Pages: [1]
  Print  
 
Jump to:  

Powered by MySQL Powered by PHP Powered by SMF 1.1.21 | SMF © 2006-2011, Simple Machines Valid XHTML 1.0! Valid CSS!